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I. INTRODUCTION

On September 24, 1997, the Supreme Court of Ohio decided the case of State

v. Lovejoy .I In Lovejoy, the Supreme Court of Ohio held that when a jury finds
a defendant not guilty as to some counts and is hung as to other counts, double
jeopardy and collateral estoppel do not apply and the defendant may be retried
upon charges for which a verdict was not reached.2 Lovejoy was acquitted of
aggravated murder with prior calculation and design and its lesser-included
offenses of murder and involuntary manslaughter) However, the jury was
hung as to the felony-murder, aggravated robbery and kidnapping charges;
therefore, the trial judge declared a mistrial on those counts.4 The Defendant
was retried and convicted of felony-murder.S Upholding the trial court's
decision, the Supreme Court of Ohio reasoned that the several counts of an
indictment which contain more than one count are not mutually dependent,
and an inconsistency within a verdict does not originate from inconsistent
responses to different counts, but only arises out of inconsistent responses to
the same count.6 Hence, retrial of related but different crimes does not involve
the doctrines of collateral estoppel or double jeopardy. Consequently, there
may be a retrial on these charges.

1683 N .E.2d 1112 (Ohio 1997).
2Jd. at 1115.

3State v. Lovejoy, No. 95APA07-849, 1996 WL52896 at*l, {Ohio App. lOth Dist. Feb.
8, 1996), rev'd, 683 N.E.2d 1112 {Ohio 1997).
4Jd.
5Jd. at •2. Under the Ohio Revised Code 2903.01 (B)'felony-murder' is termed
'aggravated murder'; however, to avoid confusion with 'aggravated murder' under part
(A), 'aggravated murder' part (B) will be referred to as ' felony-murder' throughout this
case comment.

6Lovejoy, 683 N.E.2d at 1112.
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The Supreme Court of Ohio's decision in Lovejoy protects society from
criminals who may be allowed to go free whenever there is a hung jury or a
mistrial. The purpose of the law would be thwarted if every time there was a
hung jury or a mistrial a defendant was allowed to walk free. Citizens would
not be protected if the only safeguards built into the criminal justice system
were for the accused. Therefore, allowing a defendant to be retried on charges
in which the accused was not previously acquitted does not impede justice but
instead increases the opportunities for justice. Furthermore, the accused is not
placed in jeopardy twice because jeopardy is not terminated in the first trial
since there is no final decision with a hung jury or a mistrial.
II. FAcrs

On August 16, 1993, ChristaL. Curry and her husband, Nathan Curry, were
in their apartment, which they shared with Nathan's brother, Neil Curry?
Christa was upstairs preparing to go out, and Nathan was downstairs with the
couple's twin daughters.S Christa and Nathan both heard someone kicking the
back door.9 Nathan asked Christa if she was making the noise and she
responded, no.lO She heard Nathan say something to the effect of "wait a
minute."ll Christa then heard two gunshots.12
As Christa came downstairs, she saw Nathan fall to the floor.13 The intruder
put a gun to Christa's head and forced her to lie on the floor.l4 A second man
entered the apartment and went upstairs.lS After a few minutes the second man
came back downstairs and the two intruders fled the scene in a car.l6
Within twenty minutes of the murder, police apprehended Defendant Mark
E. Lovejoy and an accomplice, Darrell Stepherson.l7 Their car had been
abandoned and several neighbors had reported seeing two young black men
jumping fences and hiding in bushes around houses in the neighborhood.IS

7[d.

at 1113.

B[d.

9[d.

10Lovejoy, 1996 WL 52896, at •2.

llLovejoy, 683 N.E.2d at 1113.
12fd.
13[d.
14[d.

15[d.

16Lovejoy, 683 N.E.2d at 1113.
17Lovejoy, 1996 WL 52896, at "2. Darrell Stepherson was subsequently identified by
Christa as the man with the gun who forced her to the ground.
lBLovejoy, 683 N.E.2d at 1114.
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One neighbor saw the men hide two guns under a bush.19 The guns were
located, and tests revealed that one of the guns was the murder weapon.20 At
the time of the Defendant's arrest, he had in his possession a black bag that
contained four pounds of marijuana.21
Lovejoy was indicted on five charges.22 He was charged with aggravated
murder with prior calculation and design,23 felony-murder,24 aggravated
robbery,25 kidnapping,26 and having a weapon under disability.27 The
l9fd.
20[d.
2lfd. Both Nathan (the victim), and Neil, his brother, were marijuana dealers. At the
time of the murder, Nathan had seven pounds of marijuana in the apartment, and Neil
had four. Neil identified the four pounds of marijuana found in Defendant's possession
as the four pounds he was keeping at Nathan's apartment.
22Lovejoy, 1996 WL 52896, at •1.

23QHio REv. CODE ANN. § 2903.01(A) (Banks-Baldwin 1997). Aggravated Murder.
"No person shall purposely, and with prior calculation and design, cause the death of
another or the unlawful termination of another's pregnancy."

24§ 2903.01(8). Felony-Murder.
"No person shall purposely cause the death of another or the unlawful
termination of another's pregnancy while committing or attempting to
commit, or while fleeing immediately after committing or attempting to
commit kidnapping, rape, aggravated arson or arson, aggravated
robbery or robbery, aggravated burglary or burglary, or escape."

25§ 2911.01(A). Aggravated Robbery.
(A) No person, in attempting or committing a theft offense, as defined
in Section 2913.01 of the Revised Code, or in fleeing immediately after
the attempt or offense, shall do any of the following:
(1) Have a deadly weapon on or about the offender's person or under the
offender's control and either display the weapon, brandish it, indicate
that the offender possesses it, or use it;
(2) Have a dangerous ordnance on or about the offender's person or
under the offender's control;
(3) Inflict, or attempt to inflict, serious physical harm on another.

26§ 2905.01. Kidnapping.
(A) No person, by force, threat, or deception, or, in the case of a victim
under the age of thirteen or mentally incompetent, by any means, shall
remove another from the place where the other person is found or
restrain the liberty of the other person, for any of the following purposes:
(1) To hold for ransom, or as a shield or hostage;
(2) To facilitate the commission of any felony or flight thereafter;
(3) To terrorize, or to inflict serious physical harm on the victim or
another;
(4) To engage in sexual activity, as defined in section 2907.01 of the
Revised Code, with the victim against the victim's will;
(5) To hinder, impede, or obstruct a function of government, or to force
any action or concession on the part of governmental authority.
(B) No person, by force, threat, or deception, or, in the case of a victim
under the age of thirteen or mentally incompetent, by any means, shall
knowingly do any of the following, under circumstances that create a
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aggravated murder and felony-murder charges included the lesser offenses of
murder,2B and involuntary manslaughter.29 The aggravated murder,
felony-murder, aggravated robbery and kidnapping charges were tried to a
jury, and the having a weapon under disability charge was tried to the bench.30
The jury acquitted the Defendant of the aggravated murder charge,
including the lesser included offenses.31 The jury was hung as to the
felony-murder, aggravated robbery and kidnapping charges.32 The court
declared a mistrial as to those charges and found the Defendant guilty of
having a weapon under disability.33
The Defendant moved to have the felony-murder charge dismissed on
double jeopardy and collateral estoppel grounds.34 The court denied the
substantial risk of serious physical harm to the victim or, in the case
of a minor victim, under circumstances that either create a substantial
risk of serious physical harm to the victim or cause physical harm to
the victim:
(1) Remove another from the place where the other person is found;
(2) Restrain another of his liberty;
(3) Hold another in a condition of involuntary servitude.
(C) Whoever violates this section is guilty of kidnapping, a felony of
the first degree. If the offender releases the victim in a safe place unharmed, kidnapping is a felony of the second degree.
27§ 2923.13(A)(2}. Having Weapons While Under Disability.
(A) Unless relieved from disability as provided in Section 2923.14 of
the Revised Code, no person shall knowingly acquire, have, carry, or
use any firearm or dangerous ordnance, if any of the following apply:
(1) The person is a fugitive from justice.
(2) The person is under indictment for or has been convicted of any felony
offense of violence or has been adjudicated a delinquent child for the
commission of an offense that, if committed by an adult, would have been
a felony offense of violence.
28§ 2903.02. Murder. "No person shall purposely cause the death of another or the
unlawful termination of another's pregnancy."

29§ 2903.04(A). Involuntary Manslaughter.
(A) No person shall cause the death of another or the unlawful termination of another's pregnancy as a proximate result of the offender's
committing or attempting to commit a felony.
(B) No person shall cause the death of another or the unlawful termination of another's pregnancy as a proximate result of the offender's committing or attempting to commit a misdemeanor of the first, second, third, or
fourth degree or a minor misdemeanor.
(C) Whoever violates this section is guilty of involuntary manslaughter.
Violation of division (A) of this section is a felony of the first degree.

30Lovejoy, 1996 WL 52896, at •1.
3lfd.
32Jd.
33Jd.

34/d. at "2.
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motion and a second trial ensued.35 The second jury found the Defendant
guilty of felony-murder, and he appealed.36
The Franklin County Court of Appeals reversed the felony-murder
conviction and remanded the weapons under disability charge. 37 The Supreme
Court of Ohio allowed a discretionary appeal and cross-appeal.38 The Court
reversed the appellate court's decision and reinstated the felony-murder
conviction.39
III. THE COURT OF APPEALS DECISION

The Court of Appeals for Franklin County reversed the felony-murder
conviction, holding that the doctrines of collateral estoppel and double
jeopardy preclude the state from retrying the felony-murder count.40 The court
concluded that since the jury previously acquitted the Defendant of the lesser
included offense of murder which included the "purposely" intent--an essential
element of felony-murder- the Defendant could not be found guilty of
felony-murder.41 The court reasoned that the felony-murder count required the
retrial of factual issues already resolved in the Defendant's favor during the
first trial.42 Therefore, the doctrines of collateral estoppel and double jeopardy
precluded retrial.43
IV. THE SUPREME COURT OF OHIO'S DECISION

Justice Lundberg Stratton, writing for the majority, disagreed with the
appellate court's holding that the doctrines of collateral estoppel and double
jeopardy precluded the state from retrying the felony-murder count.44 The
court reversed the appellate court's decision holding that these doctrines do
not apply when the inconsistency in the jury responses arises out of
inconsistent responses to different counts, as opposed to inconsistent responses
within the same coun t.45 In addition, the court found that the prosecution could
lawfully retry the hung-jury counts.46

35Lovejay, 1996 WL 528%, at ..2.
36[d.
37Jd. at~.

38Lovejay, 683 N .E.2d 1112.

39 ld. at 1120.
40Lovejoy, 1996 WL 528%, at "9.
41[d .

42[d.

43Jd.

44Lovejoy, 683 N .E.2d at 1119.
45Jd.
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In reaching its decision, the court first reviewed the history and purpose of
collateral estoppel47 and double jeopardy.48 The court explained that the
Double Jeopardy Clause49 guards against successive prosecutions for the same
offense,SO while the doctrine of collateral estoppel precludes a question of fact
distinctly at issue and directly determined by a court of competent jurisdiction
from being disputed in a subsequent suit.51 The court said, however, that "the
United
States Supreme Court has held that double jeopardy does not apply to
cases involving inconsistent verdicts and, by implication, hung juries."52
Furthermore, the court explained, "that neither a jury's failure to reach a verdict
nor a trial court's declaration of a mistrial following a hung jury is an event that
terminates jeopardy so as to bar a second trial on the mistried charges."53
Accordingly, the majority noted that nothing in the Federal Constitution barred
a retrial after a hung jury.54
Next, the court reviewed several cases in Ohio that addressed this issue.SS
Again it noted that nothing in Ohio's case law forbids a retrial after a hung jury
as long as the inconsistency does not arise out of inconsistent responses to the
same count.56
Then the majority explained how a case is sent to a jury, which supported its
conclusion that retrying a defendant when the jury is hung does not constitute

46 ld.

at 1115. Provided that other criteria are met, i.e. sufficiency of evidence.

47See generally Eli J. Richardson, Taking Issue with Preclusion: Reinventing Collateral
Estoppel, 65 Miss. L. J. 41 (1995).
48Lovejoy,683 N.E.2d at 1115.
49"Nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy
of life or limb...."U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Fifth Amendment is incorporated in the
Fourteenth Amendment and hence applicable to the states.
50 Lovejoy, 683 N.E.2d at 1115 (citing United States v. Dixon,509 U.S. 688 (1993)). See
generally Donald Eric Burton, Note, A Closer Look at the Supreme Court and the Double
Jeopardy Clause, 49 OHio ST. L.J. 799 (1988).

51 Lovejoy, 683 N.E.2d at 1115. (Although first developed in civil litigation, collateral
estoppel has been followed in federal criminal law since United States v. Oppenheimer,
242 u.s. 85 (1916)).
52 Lovejoy, 683 N.E.2d at 1115 (citing Dunn v. United States, 284 U.S. 390 (1932)). See
generally WilliamS. McAninch, Note, Unfolding the Law ofDouble Jeopardy, 44 S.C. L. REv.
411 (1993).
53 Lovejoy, 683 N.E.2d at 1116 (citing Richardson v. United States, 468 U.S. 317,325
(1984)). See generally Stacey A. Mayer, Note, Rejecting Double Jeopardy as a bar to Retrials
of Greater Offenses, 55 Mo. L. REv. 647 (1996).
54 Lovejoy, 683 N.E.2d at 1117.

55 See State v. Hicks, 538 N.E.2d 1030 (Ohio 1989); State v. Brown, 465 N.E.2d 889
(Ohio 1984); State v. Adams, 374 N.E.2d 137, (Ohio 1978), vacated on other grounds, 439
U.S. 811 (1978); Browning v. State, 165 N.E. 566 (Ohio 1929).
56Lovejoy, 683 N.E.2d at 1117.
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double jeopardy.57 The court found that the jury was instructed that the case
involved two counts.58 Count one was aggravated murder with prior
calculation and design, and count two was felony-murder based on aggravated
robbery. 59 The lesser included offenses tracked each count separately and were
not dependent upon the findings of the othercounts.60 After the jury concluded
that prior calculation and design was not proven, it was logical for the jury to
conclude that the defendant was not guilty of the remaining charges in count
one.61 However, the jury was hung as to all charges in count two.62 Retrying
the Defendant on the hung count of felony-murder did not amount to double
jeopardy because these were inconsistent verdicts to different charges and not
inconsistent responses to the same charge.63 However, if the jury had acquitted
the defendant of aggravated robbery and hung as to the felony-murder charge
based on aggravated robbery, it would be double jeopardy to retry the
defendant for felony-murder because the same issues of fact that were
necessarily decided by the first jury would be at issue again at the second trial.64
Finally, the Court explained that because murder and involuntary
manslaughter were the lesser included offenses in both counts, it was not the
same as a predicate felony (i.e. aggravated robbery) for a felony-murder
conviction.65 For these reasons, the majority concluded that retrying the
Defendant on the hung count of felony-murder did not constitute double
jeopardy.66
V. THE DISSENT

Justice Cook wrote the dissenting opinion, joined by Chief Justice Moyer and
Justice Pfeifer.67 The dissent argued that the majority relied on the wrong line
of cases, which involved inconsistent verdicts reached in a single trial, rather
than cases in which the state obtains a conviction following successive

57Jd.
58[d.
59Jd.
60[d.
61Lovejoy, 683 N.E.2d at 1118.

62Jd.
63fd. at 1119.
64Jd. See State v. Liberatore, 445 N.E.2d 1116 (Ohio 1983) (holding double jeopardy
bars retrial of the felony-murder charge when acquitted of the predicate offense); but see
Dunn v. United States, 284 U.S. 390 (holding that defendant' s conviction can stand even
though he was acquitted of the predicate offense).
65Lovejoy, 683 N.E.2d at 1119.
66Jd.
67Lovejoy, 683 N.E.2d at 1120.
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prosecutions.68 The dissent addressed each case the majority and the state
relied upon to make their point and found them to be inapplicable to this issue.
First, the dissent noted that Dunn v. United States69 was inapplicable because
it dealt with inconsistent verdicts instead of multiple prosecutions. Second, the
dissent explained, that Richardson v. United States70 was irrelevant because it
did not involve an analysis of whether a jury verdict of acquittal that
accompanies a hung jury mistrial on a related count may bar retrial under the
Double Jeopardy Clause.71 Next, the dissent addressed the state's reliance on
Johnson v. Ohio.72 The dissent concluded that it was also inapplicable because
it involved prosecution following a guilty plea that occurred without a trial
rather than retrial.73
The dissent concluded that an acquittal verdict should terminate jeopardy
not only as to the charge for which it is returned, but also as to any charge that
would require the state to prove the acquitted charge as a subcomponent.74 The
dissent based its decision on the United States Supreme Court's recognition
that, for purposes of double jeopardy, there is no difference between
reprosecuting a criminal defendant on the same count for which he received
an acquittal verdict and reprosecuting a criminal defendant on a separate
offense involving a common issue of ultimate fact that was decided in the
defendant's favor at an earlier triai.75 The dissent concluded that since it was
necessary for the state to prove every element of the acquitted murder charge
at the second trial in order to convict the Defendant on the felony-murder
charge, the Double Jeopardy Clause prohibited Defendant's retrial for
felony-murder?6

VI. ANALYSIS
The Ohio Supreme Court, in a four to three decision, overturned the Franklin
County Court of Appeals decision which reversed Lovejoy's felony-murder
conviction based on the doctrines of collateral estoppel and double jeopardy.77
The majority of the court concluded that the doctrines did not apply and that

68Jd. See Nesbitt v. Hopkins,86 F.3d 118 (8th Cir. 1996).
69fd. (citing Dunn, 284 U.S. 390).
70Jd. (citing Richardson, 468 U.S. 317).
7l]d.

72Lovejoy, 683 N.E.2d at 1120 (citing]ohnson,467 U.S. 493 (1984)).
73Jd.

74Jd.
75Jd. at 1125.
76Jd. at 1124 (citing Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 (1970)).

77Lovejoy, 683 N.E.2d at 1125.
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Lovejoy's felony-murder conviction should be reinstated?8 Three dissenting
Justices disagreed with the majority's conclusion, as well as the majority's
reasoning.79
The majority reasoned that each count of an indictment is independent of
each other, and an acquittal as to one count does not terminate jeopardy as to
the other counts of the indictment.SO Therefore, Lovejoy was not entitled to the
protections of collateral estoppel and double jeopardy.Sl On the other hand, the
dissent reasoned that an acquittal verdict terminated jeopardy not only as to
the count for which the Defendant was acquitted, but also as to the separate
offenses that shared common issues of ultimate fact necessarily determined in
the Defendant's favor.82 The dissent reasoned that because jeopardy is
terminated, the doctrine of double jeopardy bars retrial of mistried counts.83
Consequently, the dissent concluded that Lovejoy should not be retried on the
felony-murder charge since he was acquitted of aggravated murder in the first
trial.84 The second trial would necessarily involve retrial of issues already
decided in the defendant's favor in the first tria1.85
The majority's opinion is well-reasoned and draws a logical conclusion from
the statements of law. First, the court explained that jeopardy must be
terminated in order for a defendant to utilize the protections of the Double
Jeopardy Clause.86 Next, the majority emphasized that neither a hung jury nor
a mistrial terminates jeopardy.87 Therefore, it is natural to conclude that double
jeopardy does not apply in Lovejoy's situation because a hung jury does not
terminate jeopardy.ss

78Lovejoy, 683 N.E.2d at 1119.
79Jd.
80Jd.

at 1120.

Bl[d. at 1117.
82/d. at 1119.

83Lovejatj, 683 N.E.2d at 1124.
B4Id. at 1125.
85[d.
86[d.

87Jd. at 1116 (citing Richardson, 468 U.S. at 325).

88See also United States v. Reis, 788 F.2d 54 (1st Cir. 1986) (holding double jeopardy
is not violated when defendant convicted in second trial after trial resulted in mistrial
because of hung jury); Jones v. Hogg, 732 F.2d 53 (6th Cir. 1984) (holding that double
jeopardy does not bar reprosecution of accused after jury deadlock); United States v.
Brack, 747 F.2d 1142 (7th Cir. 1984) (emphasizing that it is well established that retrial
following mistrial due to a hung jury does not violate double jeopardy clause), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 1216 (1985); Walker v. Weldon, 744 F.2d 775 (11th Cir. 1984) (refusing
to depart from long established rule that a genuinely deadlocked jury requires
defendant to submit to a second trial); United States v. Glover, 731 F.2d 41 (D.C. Cir.
1984)(per curiam).
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In addition, the court explained that an inconsistent verdict can stand in Ohlo

when the inconsistency arises out of inconsistent responses to different counts
provided that the inconsistency is not within the same count.89 Considering
the fact that in Lovejoy there were no inconsistent responses within the same
count, the verdict should stand.90 If Lovejoy had been acquitted of aggravated
robbery with a hung jury on the felony-murder charge then retrial on the
felony-murder charge would be barred by double jeopardy according to this
courts holding in State v. Uberatore.91
Furthermore, the United States Supreme Court stated that the Double
Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment "does not mean that every time a
defendant is put to trial before a competent tribunal he is entitled to go free if
the trial fails to end in a final judgment. Such a rule would create an insuperable
obstacle to the administration of justice."92 Also, "the purpose of law to protect
society from those guilty of crimes frequently would be frustrated by denying
courts the power to put the defendant to trial again."93 Therefore, the majority
draws the only logical conclusion, that double jeopardy does not bar retrial of
the mistried counts because otherwise justice would not be served.
The dissent's rationale and conclusion are faulty. First, the dissent criticizes
the majority for using the wrong line of cases. The dissent incorrectly asserts
that cases involving inconsistent verdicts reached in a single trial are
inapplicable to Lovejoy because it does not answer the question presented
whlch is whether Lovejoy's acquittal on the charge of murder prevents his
retrial for felony-rnurder.94
The dissent agrees that the several counts of an indictment are not
interdependent and that an inconsistent verdict can stand, provided that the
inconsistency arises in different counts and not within the same count.95 In
addition, the dissent agrees that a mistrial following a hung jury does not
terminate jeopardy thereby triggering the protections of the Double Jeopardy
Clause.% However, the dissent disagrees that this rule applies in cases where
the jury acquits on one count but is hung as to a 'related' count.97 In other
words, the dissent is claiming that because Lovejoy was acquitted of the lesser

89Lcvejoy, 683 N .E.2d at 1117.
90Jd. See State v. Hicks, 538 N.E.2d 1030 (Ohio 1989); State v. Brown, 465 N.E.2d 889
(Ohio 1984); State v. Adams, 374 N.E.2d 137, (Ohio 1978), vacated on other grounds, 439
U.S. 811 (1978); Browning v. State, 165 N.E. 566 (Ohio 1929).
91Jd. at 1119.
92Jd. at 1116.

93 Id. at 1116 (quoting Richardson, 468 U.S. at 324-325).
94Lcvejoy, 683 N.E.2d at 1116 (quoting Richardson, 468 U.S. at 324-325).
95Jd. at 1120.
96Jd.
97[d.
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included offense of murder in count one, double jeopardy should bar re-trial
of count two, felony-murder, because it is "related" to the murder charge in
count one.
This part of the dissent's analysis is flawed because it is impliedly carving
out an exception for ' related' counts. The dissent implies that although each
count in an indictment is independent of the other counts, somehow two
'related' counts in an indictment should be treated differently. In effect, the
'related' counts are no longer independent of each other. Therefore, the dissent
concludes that an acquittal on one 'related' count can terminate jeopardy for
the other 'related' count and, as a result, trigger the protections of the Double
Jeopardy Clause. Because both the United States Supreme Court and the
Supreme Court of Ohio have never made this distinction for 'related' counts
and have specifically held that the counts of an indictment are not
interdependent,98 the dissent's conclusion is unsound.
Next, the dissent argues that the Supreme Court of Ohio in Liberatore
acknowledged that collateral estoppel is applicable to bar retrial of mistried
counts in a criminal case involving partial verdicts of acquittal.99 Liberatore
was indicted on separate counts of aggravated arson and felony-murder, with
aggravated arson as the underlying felony. The defendant was acquitted of the
aggravated arson charge but the jury was hung as to the felony-murder
charge.lOO The Supreme Court of Ohio held that double jeopardy prohibited
the retrial of a felony-murder charge when the defendant is acquitted of the
underlying felony in a previous trial and hung as to the compound offense of
felony-murder.101 The dissent determined that because Lovejoy was partially
acquitted, he should not be retried on the felony-murder charge.102
The dissent's conclusion is incorrect because the aggravated murder charge
on which Lovejoy was acquitted was not the underlying felony for the
felony-murder charge.103 If Lovejoy had been acquitted on the aggravated
robbery charge, applying Liberatore, the acquittal would have barred a
subsequent prosecution for felony-murder because aggravated robbery was
the underlying felony. Since the jury was hung as to the underlying felony, as
well as the compound offense,I04 Liberatore does not apply. Consequently, the

98See United States v . Powell, 469 U.S. 57 (1984); United States v. Dunn, 284 U.S. 390
(1932); State v. Hicks 538 N .E.2d 1030 (Ohio 1989); State v. Brown465 N.E.2d 889 (Ohio
1984); State v. Adams, 374 N.E.2d 37 (Ohio 1978) paragraph two of the syllabus, vacated
on other grounds, 439 U.S. 811 (1978); Browning v. State, 165 N.E. 566 (Ohio 1929}.
99 Lovejoy, 683 N.E.2d at 1122.
H){) Liberatore, 445 N.E.2d at 1117.

101Jd. at 1118.
102Lovejoy, 683 N.E.2d at 1125.

103/d. at 1114.
104Lovejay, 1996 WL528%, at *1.
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doctrines of collateral estoppel and double jeopardy do not protect the
Defendant as the dissent suggests.
After determining that the doctrine of collateral estoppel was potentially
applicable, the dissent looked to see "whether a rational jury could have
grounded its verdict upon an issue other than that which the defendant seeks
to foreclose from consideration."105 The dissent concluded that the defendant
had not carried his burden of establishing that the issue he wished to preclude
from relitigation was the same issue the jury previously decided in his favor.106
The dissent reasoned that it was possible that the jury thought it was not able
to consider the evidence related to the robbery charge in connection with the
aggravated murder charge and its lesser included offenses.107 Since the
prosecution based its proof of intent on the Defendant's participation in the
aggravated robbe~ without the benefit of the inferences drawn from the
commission of the robbery, the jury had little evidence of Lovejoy's intent.JOS
As a result, the dissent concluded that it was logical to acquit Lovejoy on all
the charges in count one because the intent element was missing.109 This
argument by the dissent seems to discredit its final conclusion; however, the
dissent still concluded that double jeopardy bars a second trial.
Although the state must prove intent again in the second trial, by the
dissent's own admission, this element was not necessarily decided in Lovejoy's
favor in the first trial. In other words, Lovejoy may not have had the
independent intent for aggravated murder in count one, but he may have had
the requisite intent for felony-murder which may be inferred from his
participation in the aggravated robbery.llO
Finally, the dissent states that Lovejoy's acquittal of murder in connection
with the aggravated murder charge should bar a second trial after a hung jury
mistrial on the felony-murder charge based on the Blockburger test. However,
the dissent does not discuss how it arrives at this conclusion.111 The dissent
merely states that because the state is required to prove every element of the
formerly acquitted murder charge in order to prove felony-murder, retrial is
prohibited.112 Its conclusion is flawed because Blockburger states that "a single

105Lovejay, 683 N.E.2d at 1122 (quoting Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436,444 (1970)).
106[d. at 1123.

107Jd.
l08fd.
109[d.

110Compare with Liberatore, 445 N.E.2d at 1118 (Holmes, J., dissenting) (arguing that
since the defendant was not accused of placing the bomb himself, but rather was accused
of being part of the murder plan, the jury could have found the defendant not guilty of
aggravated arson, but still guilty of being part of the conspiracy to commit murder and
hence guilty of felony-murder).
Ill Lovejoy, 683

N .E.2d at 1125.

112fd.
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act may be an offense against ~o statutes; and if each statute requires proof of
an additional fact which the other does not, an acquittal or conviction under
either statute does not exempt the defendant from prosecution and punishment
under the other."113 Since felony-murder requires proof of an underlying
felony, and aggravated murder does not, Blockburger does not bar a second trial.
The Supreme Court of Ohio's decision in wvejay was the correct decision. In
a society where crime is pervasive, the criminal justice system needs to protect
more than just the accused . The Supreme Court of Ohio's decision makes this
possible because it does not allow the release of a criminal when a trial fails to
end in a final judgment. This decision protects society as a whole, and will
lessen the tremendous amount of pressure on prosecutors to obtain a final
judgment every time or risk allowing criminals to go free.

VII. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court of Ohio's decision in Lovejoy helps to preserve the
purpose of our criminal laws, which is to protect society. Allowing a defendant
to be retried on charges in which the accused was not previously acquitted, but
rather the jury was hung or there was a mistrial, does not frustrate justice but
instead greatly increases the opportunities for justice. In addition, the accused
is not placed in jeopardy twice because jeopardy was never terminated in the
first trial since there is no final decision .with a hung jury or a mistrial.
Consequently, allowing a defendant to be retried when a final decision has not
been reached will help maintain a safer society for all of us.
NICOLE

M. ELLIS

113B!ockburger v . United States, 284 U.S. 299,304 (1932).
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